The polymorphic gates are the circuit cells that deliver different functions with the different external input, supply voltage or temperature. It is an effective method to resist the reverse engineering attacks, for the attackers cannot distinguish the correct function based on the netlist of the circuit. The researchers have found out that the RRAM based Look-Up Table ( LUT) has higher performance and less area, comparing with the CMOS based counterparts. However, the attackers can tell the functions of the previous proposed RRAM based LUTs by measuring the resistance states of the RRAM cells. This work proposes an RRAM based polymorphic gate, which implements 16 basic logic functions with 8 RRAM cells in 4 working cycles. Furthermore, the multi-input LUT scheme is proposed based on the polymorphic gate. It is difficult for the attackers to distinguish the circuit function, because the function of the LUT is determined by the applied voltages and the resistance states of the RRAM devices, and the n-input LUT circuit is implemented with the constant area regardless of the number of inputs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The polymorphic gate/circuit integrates multiple functionalities into the single circuit structure. It implements different functions by applying the different external input, supply voltage or temperature [1] - [3] . It is regarded as one of the effective methods to resist the reverse engineering attacks [2] , for the attackers are not able to distinguish the correct function based on the circuit layout or netlist.
The LUT (Look-Up Table) is a widely used circuit module. Recently, the RRAM (Resistive Random Access Memory) device, which represents the logic states with the resistance values, has been applied to the design of LUT circuits to meet the performance and area challenges [4] - [7] . Intuitively, these configurable RRAM based LUT circuits are polymorphic. But in fact, the attackers can tell the correct function of the previous RRAM based LUT schemes by measuring the resistance states of the RRAM devices. The RRAM based polymorphic gate/circuit is an emerging technique to enhance the security of the RRAM based hardware. Rezaei et al. [8] have proposed the NAND/NOR gate and the Buffer/Inverter gate for the circuit obfuscation.
Yang et al. [9] have proposed two dual functional memristive gates, one is for the XOR/AND functions, and the other is for the XNOR/OR functions. However, none of these previous RRAM based polymorphic gates implement all the LUT functions. This work designs a polymorphic LUT scheme with good security characteristics based on the proposed LUT gate.
II. THE PROPOSED POLYMORPHIC LUT GATE A. THE GATE CIRCUIT
The proposed polymorphic LUT gate is presented in Fig. 1 (a) , where the set end of the RRAM device is labeled with the black mark. It works following the steps below, and each step consumes single working cycle.
Step 1: Initialization. Connect the input terminals between the two RRAM devices in each row to GND, and apply the voltage V p to the terminals K 0 ∼K 3 and V out . V p ≥ max{|V reset |, V set }, where V reset and V set are the threshold voltages to change the RRAM device to the high resistance state (HRS) and low resistance state (LRS), respectively. This operation sets the M 1 , M 2 , M 6 and M 8 to LRS, and resets the M 3 , M 4 , M 5 and M 7 to HRS.
Step 2: Input A. The voltage V cond is applied to the terminals K 0 ∼K 3 , and the voltage V A is applied to the input terminals of the circuit. The logic value of input A is represented by the voltage difference between the right end and the left end of the RRAM devices in the left column of Fig. 1 (a) . If A = 1, V A -V cond ≥ V p , it resets the M 1 and M 2 to HRS, and set the M 3 and M 4 to LRS. If A = 0, V A -V cond < min{|V reset |, V set }, the resistance states of M 1 ∼M 4 are not changed. The terminal V out is floating during this step, it guarantees that the resistance states of M 5 ∼M 8 remain unchanged.
Step 3: Input B. The voltage V B and V cond are applied to the input terminals and the right terminals of the RRAM devices M 5 ∼M 8 , respectively. The logic value of input B is represented by the voltage difference between the left end and right end of each RRAM device in the right column of Fig. 1 Step 4: Output. Select the logic function by applying the selection code on K 0 ∼K 3 .
does not change the resistance states of the RRAM devices. The V out is high for the logic 1 cases, and V out is low for the logic 0 cases. The output state equals to K 3Ā B + K 2ĀB + K 1 AB + K 0 AB. The functions of the proposed gate are collected in Table 1 . The proposed gate is a two-input LUT circuit, for all the two-input Boolean functions are realized. After the third step, the resistance states of the RRAM devices in the four rows have four combinations, i.e., LRS/HRS, HRS/LRS, LRS/LRS, HRS/HRS, according to the input combinations. The output voltage is determined by the voltage division of these RRAM devices. The lowest output voltage for logic 1 is obtained, if V c is applied on the terminal K i , i ∈ [0, 3], which the two RRAM devices in the corresponding row are all in LRS, and GND is connected to the other three selection terminals. In such a case, the output voltage is computed by the formula (1), where the R H and R L are the resistance values of the RRAM devices with HRS and LRS, respectively. And the highest output voltage for logic 0 is obtained, if GND is connected to the terminal K i , which the two RRAM devices in the corresponding row are all in LRS, and V c is applied on the other three selection terminals. In such a case, the output voltage is obtained by the formula (2) .
The simulations of the two cases above are conducted with the RRAM device model [10] , and the waveforms of the output terminal are presented in Fig. 1 (b) and (c), respectively. In the simulation, V set = 1V, V reset = −1.1V, V p = 1.2V, V cond = −0.7V, V c = 0.6V, all the inputs A and B are logic 1, the period of working cycle is 100ns. For the first case, the output voltage V out is about 0.5927V, it satisfies the condition of V out ≥ V p + V cond . And for the second case, the output voltage V out is about 0.1705V, which meets the condition of V out < min{|V reset |, V set } + V cond . The functions of the two-input LUT gate are verified.
B. THE SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED GATE
The hardware security problem is of great concern in recent years. We discuss the countermeasure features of the proposed polymorphic gate as follows.
Reverse Engineering: By the reverse engineering techniques, the attackers can extract and duplicate the unprotected circuit design from the circuit layout, without the authorization of the circuit designers [11] . The proposed polymorphic gate implements arbitrary two-input Boolean function in the same circuit structure and the uniformed working steps. It resists the reverse engineering attacks, because the attackers are not able to distinguish the correct function of the proposed circuit, even if the layout and netlist of the circuit is extracted correctly by the reverse engineering techniques.
The memristor based circuits are vulnerable to the resistance analysis attacks, because of the non-volatile characteristics of the memristive device. The attackers are able to analyze the state of the circuit by measuring the resistance values of the memristive devices in each step, and rebuild the state transition graph of the circuit. However, for the proposed gate circuit, the circuit function is not only determined by the resistance states of the RRAM devices, but also selected by the voltage combinations on the terminal K i in the output step, i∈[0, 3]. It resists the memristor resistance analysis attacks, for the attackers are not able to tell the correct function of the gate based on the logic states stored in the RRAM devices.
Inside Foundry Attack: The camouflage techniques, such as dummy contact [12] , are effective to resist the common reverse engineering attacks. However, the possibility of the Inside Foundry Attack (IFA) increases, if the unprotected circuits are fabricated by the untrusted foundries [8] . The untrusted foundry is able to remove the redundant and/or confusing circuits to restore the real netlist of the circuit through the inside foundry attack, because the foundry can obtain the detailed information of the circuit. The proposed polymorphic gate implements all the two-input Boolean functions without any redundant circuit. If the malicious foundry changed the circuit, the designers are easy to detect those changes by the functional testing method.
• Device removal attack: Any removal operation on the component in the fabricated circuit is named as the device removal attack. Without losing generality, let's assume that the RRAM device M 1 in Fig. 1 (a) are removed, as presented in Fig. 2 (a) . It changes the function of the circuit into K 3 B+ K 2 AB+K 1 AB+K 0 AB. The circuit in Fig. 2 (a) is not able to implement the two-input LUT functions AB, A, A + B, A + B, A⊗B. The attack fails for the proposed polymorphic gate, because the circuit in Fig. 2 (a) only integrates 11 functions. 
Reversed polarity attack:
The changes on the circuit layout may be neglectful, if the malicious foundry only reverse the polarity of some devices. Assume that the polarity of RRAM device M 1 in Fig. 1(a) is reversed maliciously, the polarity combination of the RRAM cells in the first and third rows become the same, as presented in Fig. 2 (b) . The circuit function is changed to K 3 AB + K 2 AB + K 1 AB + K 0 AB, the LUT functions AB, B, A + B, A, A + B, A + B, A ⊗ B can not be implemented. The gate in Fig. 2 (b) only implements 9 two-input LUT functions.
The analysis above show that the proposed polymorphic gate resists the inside foundry attacks, because the changes on the circuit layout can be detected in the testing house.
C. THE COMPARISON OF THE RRAM BASED MULTIFUNCTIONAL GATES
The researchers have studied the RRAM based multifunctional gates, which are useful as the polymorphic gates. Fig. 3 (a) and (b) present the multifunctional gates proposed in [8] . The functions of the gates are determined by the resistance states of the RRAM cells, and the attackers are able to analyze the circuit function by reading the states of the RRAM devices. Fig. 4 (b) and (c) present the multifunctional circuits in [9] . The different logic functions of the circuits output the results at the different terminals, although the functions of the gates are not only determined by the resistance states. These drawbacks reduce the complexity of the attacks. Furthermore, these multifunctional gates have the hybrid RRAM/MOS structure, which consumes relatively larger area. Table 2 compares the proposed polymorphic gate with the reported RRAM based multi-functional gates. It is seen that the proposed gate consumes less area for it is a MOS-less solution. The function of the proposed gate is selected by the applied voltage combinations on K 0 ∼K 3 , and the different Boolean functions share the same output terminal. In fact, the circuit functions can be analyzed by the exhaustive tests. The more functions integrated in the polymorphic circuit, the more difficult it is to attack the circuit. The proposed polymorphic gate implements all the 16 two-input Boolean functions. It requires 2 6 = 64 attacks to enumerate the functions of the proposed polymorphic gate. It shows much more powerful capability to resist the exhaustive test attacks comparing with the previous multifunctional gates. 
III. THE MULTI-INPUT POLYMORPHIC LUT SCHEME A. THE PROPOSED POLYMORPHIC LUT SCHEME
We propose a multi-input LUT scheme based on the twoinput LUT gate in Section II. The scheme is shown in Fig. 5 (a) , which consists two interconnected two-input LUT gates. The output of the left gate is fed into the right one, and the output of the right gate is fed back to the left one. The buffer is inserted to each output line for the isolation and voltage recovery purpose. The MOSFET switches are added between each common nodes of the two RRAM devices in every row and the output terminal of the other gate. The multi-input LUT functionality are realized if these two gates work alternatively. Actually, the circuit performance can be enhanced, because some of the operations in the proposed LUT scheme can operate in parallel. The output operation of one two-input LUT gate can execute with one of the input operations of the other two-input LUT gate in the same cycle. The pipelined operations of the two gates are illustrated as Fig. 5 (b) . The number of working cycles required by the n-input LUT scheme is calculated following the formula (3).
Working cycles for n − input LUT = ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ 4 n = 2 5 n = 3 2n n > 3
(3)
B. THE COMPARISON OF THE RRAM BASED LUT SCHEMES
The performance and area of the proposed LUT scheme are compared with the previously reported RRAM based LUT schemes in Table 3 . The performance of the circuit is characterized by the number of cycles to obtain the computation result, and the area of the circuit is represented by the number of RRAM devices and the number of MOSFET devices. It is seen from Table 3 that the proposed n-input LUT scheme constantly consumes 16 RRAM devices and 16 MOSFET devices, regardless of the number of LUT inputs, and it is an area efficient LUT scheme for the large scale cases. Table 4 compares the security characteristics of the proposed LUT scheme with the previous RRAM based LUT schemes. Thanks for the proposed polymorphic gate, the proposed multi-input LUT scheme resists all the attacks, as shown in Table 4 . Furthermore, the attackers are not able to count the number of inputs of the LUT circuit, because the proposed LUT scheme has constant area, regardless of the number of inputs of the LUT. It thwarts the exhaustive test attacks effectively. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposed n-input LUT scheme is an area efficient solution, for its area does not increase with the number of inputs if n > 2. It has an acceptable performance, because the required working cycles of the proposed n-input LUT scheme are linear with the number of inputs. The highlight is that, the proposed n-input LUT scheme resists the reverse engineering attacks and the inside foundry attacks, because of the good polymorphism of the proposed two-input LUT gate. These features are very helpful for the implementation of the hardware protection techniques, such as watermarking, fingerprint, and logic locking. And the proposed n-input LUT scheme withstands the known attacks, if it is applied to the RRAM based FPGAs.
